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Abstract
Background: Concerns have been raised about how the transmission of emerging infectious diseases from patients to
healthcare workers (HCWs) and vice versa could be recognized and prevented in a timely manner. An effective strategy to
block transmission of pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza in HCWs is important.
Methodology/Principal Findings: An infection control program was implemented to survey and prevent nosocomial
outbreaks of H1N1 (2009) influenza at a 2,600-bed, tertiary-care academic hospital. In total, 4,963 employees at Kaohsiung
Chang Gung Memorial Hospital recorded their temperature and received online education on control practices for influenza
infections. Administration records provided vaccination records and occupational characteristics of all HCWs. Early
recognition of a pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza case was followed by a semi-structured questionnaire to analyze possible
routes of patient contact, household contact, or unspecified contact. Surveillance spanned August 1, 2009 to January 31,
2010; 51 HCWs were confirmed to have novel H1N1 (2009) influenza by quantitative real-time reverse transcription
polymerase chain reaction. Prevalence of patient contact, household contact, or unspecified contact infection was 13.7% (7/
51), 13.7% (7/51), and 72.5% (37/51), respectively. The prevalence of the novel H1N1 infection was significantly lower among
vaccinated HCWs than among unvaccinated HCWs (p,0.001). Higher viral loads in throat swabs were found in HCWs with
patient and household contact infection than in those with unspecified contact infection (4.15 vs. 3.53 copies/mL, log10,
p=0.035).
Conclusion: A surveillance system with daily temperature recordings and online education for HCWs is important for a low
attack rate of H1N1 (2009) influenza transmission before H1N1 (2009) influenza vaccination is available, and the attack rate is
further decreased after mass vaccination. Unspecified contact infection rates were significantly higher than that of patient
contact and household contact infection, highlighting the need for public education of influenza transmission in addition to
hospital infection control.
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Introduction
H1N1 (2009) influenza was another pandemic infection that
followed the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic.
During the 2003 SARS outbreak, our 2600-bed medical center
experienced a serious nosocomial infection that resulted in closure
of the facility in a bid to contain the hospital-acquired infection
[1]. Since then, concerns have been raised about how the
transmission of emerging infectious diseases from patients to
healthcare workers (HCWs) and vice versa could be recognized
and prevented in a timely manner [2,3]. Thus, the hospital
infection control team has been enhancing infection control
training for HCWs and implementing hospital-wide surveillance
during outbreaks of infection.
The pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza outbreak, which emerged
from the United States and Mexico in April 2009, rapidly spread
worldwide, and cases were recorded even in the winter of 2010
[4,5]. The first imported case in Taiwan was diagnosed in May
2009 [6] and the virus spread to the community in July the same
year [7]. After this development, our infection control team
immediately designed a series of strategies to enhance our
colleagues’ awareness and prevention of hospital-acquired infec-
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the increased demand for healthcare service, particularly emer-
gency rooms and inpatient beds, and increased absenteeism of sick
HCWs will reduce the quality of healthcare provided.
There are a number of reports concerning the incidence,
transmission, and risk factors for H1N1 influenza infection in
HCWs [8,9,10]. Thus, an effective strategy to block transmission
of pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza in HCWs is important. This
study was conducted to investigate the different transmission
routes among HCWs and risk factors for infection among different
subgroups of HCWs. Analysis was also carried out to determine
whether infection control practices and vaccination protected
HCWs from novel H1N1 (2009) influenza infection.
Methods
Ethics statement and participants
This study was approved by the Institution Review Board (IRB)
of Kaohsiung Chang Gung Memorial Hospital (KCGMH),
Taiwan. Our study was conducted at KCGMH, a 2600-bed
tertiary-care center in southern Taiwan. According to the
KCGMH annual census reports, 3986 of the 4963 HCWs who
worked for KCGMH in 2009 were involved in direct patient care.
We obtained informed consent of H1N1-infected HCWs to collect
the semi-structured questionnaires with personal information,
history and data protected by infection control team.
Case definition
HCWs were defined as employees of KCGMH providing
clinical or nonclinical services. The clinical HCW group included
those involved in patient care, such as physicians, nurses, nursing
assistants, therapists, pharmacists, infection control nurses, and
laboratory personnel. Nonclinical HCWs were defined as those
who were not involved in patient care, such as clerical, dietary,
housekeeping, and administrative staff, and volunteers. HCWs
with H1N1 influenza infection were defined as those who had
influenza-like illness (ILI) and were positive for H1N1 influenza by
real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR). ILI was defined as fever (body temperature §38uC), cough,
and/or sore throat in the absence of a known cause other than
influenza. Patient contact infection was defined as a laboratory-
confirmed case of influenza in a HCW who had contact with a
H1N1 influenza-confirmed patient during his/her course of work
in the hospital. Household contact infection was defined as a
laboratory-confirmed case of influenza in a HCW who had
contact with a H1N1 influenza-confirmed household member at
home. Unspecified contact infection was defined as a laboratory-
confirmed case of influenza in a HCW who did not belong to the
patient contact or household contact infection groups.
Study design and data collection
The aim of this study was to describe an infection control
program implemented to reduce transmission of pandemic H1N1
(2009) influenza in a tertiary-care center (KCGMH) by using an
online health integration system (HIS) from August 1, 2009 to
January 31, 2010. The infection control program at KCGMH
included online education about infection control practices for
HCWs, early recognition of index cases in the hospital, and audits
for infection control compliance such as surgical mask practice and
administrative support, which was modified from the infection
control guidelines issued by Centers for Disease Control, Taiwan
(Figure 1).
The details of the infection control program were established as
listed in Table 1. The online education module offered lectures
aimed at improving understanding of not only influenza, but also
of emerging or novel diseases, as well as presenting the general
principles of infection control and infectious disease prevention,
and video or graphic demonstrations of hand washing and
gowning/degowning of personal protective equipment. After
viewing the lectures, all staff was required to take an online test
that consisted of 10 multiple-choice questions. One point was
awarded for each correct answer, and a pass was based on 10
correct answers. Staff members who were unable to achieve this
goal were required to retake the test with 10 different questions.
The infection control program also required all HCWs to
record their daily body temperature in an online reporting system.
The temperature record was logged online once daily (at
approximately 8 AM). The HCWs on night duty logged their
temperature before each shift. The HCWs could not log their
temperatures on their days off, but were required to report to their
team leader within 24 hours if they had body temperatures
§38uC. If a HCW’s body temperature was §38uC, he/she was
advised to visit the ILI clinic immediately.
A standard and transmission-based precaution protocol in
clinical areas, especially regarding strictly observed hand hygiene,
was established before the outbreak. Vaccination records and
occupation characteristics for all hospital employees were obtained
from administrative records. According to infection control
guidelines at KCGMH, any HCW who developed ILI should
report to the infection control team within 24 hours. Afebrile
HCWs suspected of having H1N1 infection were also required to
report to the infection control team within 24 hours. Throat
(tonsillopharyngeal) swabs from sick HCWs were obtained for
diagnosis of H1N1 influenza by a quantitative RT-PCR assay
developed in our previous study [11]. After diagnosis was
confirmed, a member of the infection control team conducted a
face-to-face interview with the HCW to complete a semi-
structured questionnaire to analyze possible routes of patient,
household, or unspecified contact. The content of the question-
naire included the HCW’s age, sex, symptoms/signs, onset of
disease, coexisting condition(s), working location, and TOCC
(travel, occupation, contact, cluster) history. HCWs confirmed
with H1N1 infection received a 7-day off clinical duty period. All
of the strategies were implemented at the same time and were
initiated after the first imported case was diagnosed in Taiwan
while there was no case of ILI among HCWs in the hospital.
Statistical methods
Demographic characteristics and possible transmission routes
are presented as numbers (percentages). Viral load for RT-PCR
are presented as mean 6 SEM values. Differences among groups
regarding to occupation, working location and vaccination were
determined by using Fisher exact test or univariate logistic
regression. Odds ratio (OR) values were calculated with 95%
confidence intervals (CI). Student’s t-test was used for statistical
comparisons between continuous variables. P value of less than
0.05 was statistically significant. All analyses were performed using
SPSS 13.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
Results
Infection control preparedness for pandemic H1N1
(2009) influenza
Between May 4 and 16, 2009, 14 lecture sessions with an overall
attendance of 4689 (94.5%) hospital staff were held to provide up-
to-date knowledge and infection control practice to prevent
transmission of H1N1 influenza. Online training was held twice
before the outbreak of H1N1 influenza in the community. The
Reducing Transmission of H1N1 (2009) Influenza
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e32731rate of HCWs who attended each online training session was
91.8% in May and 97.3% in July. Each person required at least
1 hour to complete each session, and were required to pass by
taking an online test that comprised 10 questions. The vaccination
program was not included in the original infection control strategy,
but was introduced on November 1, 2009, according to the
Figure 1. Infection control strategy outcomes for prevention of nosocomial transmission of H1N1 influenza at KCGMH.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032731.g001
Table 1. Infection control program in prevention of transmission of pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza.
1. Education of infection control practice
(1) Traditional and online learning and review of general principles of infection control for all healthcare workers immediately before outbreak of pandemic H1N1
(2009) influenza in community.
(2) Specific infection control program designed for staff caring for patients with pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza in isolation rooms.
2. Administrative support
(1) Providing timely supply of manpower and equipment for rapid diagnosis of pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza.
(2) Establishing dedicated clinics for patients with flu-like symptoms to avoid transmission of pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza from sufferers to non-sufferers
crowded at outpatient clinics and in emergency departments in particular.
(3) Provide 75% alcohol-based solution for hand rub in all inpatient rooms, corridors, and outpatient clinics.
3. HIS (Health Integration System)
(1) Daily online reporting of healthcare workers’ body temperatures.
(2) Information of any febrile healthcare worker or from outpatient clinics routinely reported on daily basis transmitted to an infection control team for further
analysis and investigation as necessary.
(3) Analysis of epidemiologic trends of patients and hospital workers reported to suffer influenza-like illness.
(4) Immediately alerting the hospital infection control team to any positive laboratory result confirming a newly diagnosed pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza case.
4. Early recognition of index cases
(1) Screening and triage of symptomatic patients in influenza-like clinic and emergency room, and admission to isolation rooms.
(2) Prompt referral of the patients with nosocomial onset of respiratory symptoms to isolation rooms.
(3) Availability of real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) results of clinical specimens from patients with clinically suspected pandemic
H1N1 (2009) influenza within 24 h.
5. Audit of infection control compliance
(1) Ensuring adherence to strict hand hygiene and surgical mask wearing under supervision of infection control practitioners.
(2) A designed questionnaire dispatched to assess if the healthcare workers understand the safe infection control practice.
(3) Assessment of the understanding of the infection control practice in isolation rooms among healthcare workers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032731.t001
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practice observed by the members of infection control team, the
overall compliance rate of HCWs ranged 88.2–95.7% throughout
the duration of surveillance. The internal medicine ward had the
lowest compliance rate (84.2%) in August. The audit of gowning
practices of personal protective equipment in isolation rooms was
respectively performed in August, October, and December 2009,
the overall compliance rate reached 100% consistently.
The daily rate of HCWs who filled out the body temperature
log ranged 95.8–96.4%. One hundred and seventy-five HCWs
reported fever. Of those febrile HCWs, 37 (21.1%) had H1N1.
There was no significant difference in age, sex distribution, and
working location between the non-H1N1 HCWs and H1N1
HCWs. Fourteen afebrile HCWs with respiratory tract symptoms
(cough, rhinorrhea or sore throat) were reported to the infection
control team via HIS after they visited the outpatient clinic and
were laboratory-confirmed with H1N1 infection. Of the 138
febrile but non-H1N1 HCWs, 105 had upper respiratory tract
infection caused by viruses other than influenza, 15 had
gastrointestinal tract infection caused by viruses other than
influenza, 8 had lower respiratory tract infection caused by
bacteria, 7 had urinary tract infection, and 3 had cellulitis.
Pandemic H1N1 (2009) influenza in the hospital
Throughout the 6-month surveillance period, the number of
patients with ILI who visited our hospital for treatment peaked in
early September and declined significantly after a national
vaccination program was initiated in Taiwan on November 1,
2009 (Figure 2). HCWs reporting H1N1 infection occurred most
frequently in September, which was compatible with the peak
number of patients with ILI in early September (Figure 2).
Similarly, the number of HCWs with H1N1 infection declined
after national vaccination was introduced. There were no fatal
cases in the cohort analysis.
Patient, household, or unspecified contact with H1N1
(2009) influenza
Throughout the duration of surveillance, 51 HCWs (1.0%) were
confirmed to have H1N1 infection (Table 2). These included 47
clinical HCWs (92.2%) and 4 nonclinical HCWs (7.8%). The
attack rate was significantly higher in clinical HCWs than in
nonclinical HCWs (1.2% vs. 0.4%; p=0.032). The OR was 2.90
(95% CI: 1.04–8.08). The mean age of the 51 HCWs was
31.966.6 years (range, 19–48 years). The majority of the HCWs
were women (84.3%). Unspecified contact infections (37/51) were
the most frequently reported infection/exposure routes, followed
by patient contact (7/51) and household contact infections (7/51).
The percentage of clinical HCWs reporting unspecified contact
infection was higher than the percentage of those infected by other
routes of transmission. Among the sick HCWs, 8 had a coexisting
condition; 5 had hypertension (9.8%), 2 had asthma (3.9%), and 1
had nephrotic syndrome (2.0%).
Professional association of pandemic H1N1 (2009)
influenza
The distribution of attack rate for H1N1 influenza among
HCWs is presented in Table 3. The attack rate among different
HCW groups was significantly different (p=0.027). The attack
rate was highest among nurses (1.5%), followed by physicians
(1.0%), other clinical HCWs (0.7%), and administrative and
ancillary workers (0.4%). The distribution of infection based on
work location was significantly different (p,0.001). The attack rate
was highest among wards (2.1%), followed by outpatient
departments (1.9%), emergency rooms (1.7%), intensive care units
(1.2%), and was lowest in non-patient care locations (0.2%).
Furthermore, 47 HCWs (0.9%) were infected with H1N1
influenza before the vaccination was introduced. The other 4
HCWs were infected with H1N1 influenza even after they had
received vaccination. It was clear that the HCWs without
Figure 2. Distribution of patients with ILI and HCWs with H1N1 influenza from August 1, 2009 to January 31, 2010.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032731.g002
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those with vaccination (p,0.001) during the surveillance period.
Cough (90.5%), fever exceeding 38uC (72.5%), rhinorrhea
(68.2%), sore throat (56.7%) and muscle aches (21.6%) were the
most frequently reported symptoms among HCWs with H1N1
influenza infection. Through analysis of the correlation between
viral loads and different routes of transmission, we found that the
viral load was significantly higher in HCWs with patient contact
and household contact infections than in those with unspecified
contact infections (4.15 vs. 3.53 copies/mL, log10, p=0.035)
(Figure 3).
Discussion
In this study, we described the surveillance for H1N1 influenza
among HCWs in a large medical facility. During the 6-month
surveillance, 51 (1.0%) HCWs were confirmed to have H1N1
influenza infection. The attack rate among HCWs was 0.9%
before the vaccination program was implemented, and was lower
than that in another study (5.4%) [10]. It means that the infection
control program in this study was observed to have a low attack
rate of confirmed H1N1 cases. The low attack rate was
attributable to an intensive infection control/monitoring/educa-
tion program and universal vaccination policy. More importantly,
Table 2. Characteristics of healthcare workers (HCWs) with
H1N1 influenza infection.
Variables
Clinical HCWs (%)
N=47
Nonclinical HCWs (%)
N=4
Age groups (years)
,30 18 (38.3) 1 (25.0)
31–40 22 (46.8) 2 (50.0)
41–49 7 (14.9) 1 (25.0)
Gender
Male 6 (12.8) 2 (50.0)
Female 41 (87.2) 2 (50.0)
Exposure
Patient contact 7 (14.9) 0 (0)
Household contact 7 (14.9) 0 (0)
Unspecified contact 33 (70.2) 4 (100)
Coexisting condition
None 39 (83.0) 4 (100)
Asthma 2 (4.3) 0 (0)
Hypertension 5 (10.6) 0 (0)
Nephrotic syndrome 1 (2.1) 0 (0)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032731.t002
Table 3. Attack rates for healthcare workers (HCWs) with H1N1 influenza infection classified by occupation, work location, and
vaccination status.
Variables Number of participants Number of infections (%) OR (95% CI) p value
Occupation 0.027
Nurse 2032 31 (1.5) 1
Physician 778 8 (1.0) 0.67 (0.31–1.47) 0.316
Other clinical HCW 1176 8 (0.7) 0.44 (0.20–0.97) 0.040
Administrative and ancillary worker 977 4 (0.4) 0.27 (0.09–0.75) 0.013
Working location ,0.001
Wards 1201 25 (2.1) 1
OPD 639 12 (1.9) 0.90 (0.45–1.80) 0.767
ER 172 3 (1.7) 0.84 (0.25–2.80) 0.770
ICU 577 7 (1.2) 0.58 (0.25–1.34) 0.203
Non-patient care locations 2374 4 (0.2) 0.08 (0.03–0.23) ,0.001
Vaccination
Pre-vaccination 4963 47 (0.9) 1 ,0.001
Post-vaccination 4740 4 (0.1) 0.09 (0.03–0.25)
ER, emergency room; ICU, intensive care unit; OPD, outpatient department; OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032731.t003
Figure 3. Comparison of viral loads in throat swabs from HCWs
with different transmission routes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032731.g003
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was much lower than that acquired from unspecified contact in the
2600-bed hospital cohort. This finding suggests that infection
control is the most important strategy for control of H1N1
influenza transmission in a hospital before the availability of H1N1
influenza vaccination, and although HCWs may take every
precaution to guard against acquiring influenza from patient care,
they may still be infected from non-patient care sources.
The KCGMH guidelines for H1N1 influenza were adapted
from the experience with the SARS outbreak and were approved
by a multidisciplinary team led by the infection control
department. These guidelines were locally customized according
to the guidelines defined by the World Health Organization and
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) [12,13]. The
low attack rate for hospital-acquired infection indicated that the
infection control program was effective. Particularly, HCWs with
H1N1 infection under medical surveillance were advised to be
released from clinical duty and required to seek medical support
for appropriate treatment. This strategy could minimize the risk of
transmission among HCWs and patients in the hospital. Our study
showed that an online HCW surveillance system is necessary for
the detection of hospital transmission of pathogens, including
novel H1N1 (2009) influenza virus. Implementation of hospital-
wide surveillance, early detection, and early antiviral use will be
important to limit the transmission of an emerging infectious
disease such as H1N1 influenza among HCWs.
The overall 6-month attack rate was 1.0% among HCWs. As
expected, the risk was not homogenous throughout the hospital.
This study also found that nurses were at the highest risk for
infection among all HCW subgroups; this finding is similar to that
of other studies [8,10]. Regarding work location, emergency
rooms and pandemic (H1N1) isolation wards have been reported
to be places with the highest risk [8,10]. However, our study found
that ordinary wards were the work locations with the highest risk.
The reason that nurses were at a higher risk remains unclear; a
possible explanation is that they were exposed more frequently to
sick patients and the patients’ relatives and visitors than were other
HCWs during their course of work. The wards experienced the
highest attack rate, probably because the HCWs in those wards
had less stringent protection measures than other HCWs did.
In addition to exposure to infected patients, contact with sick
colleagues and household members were reported to be associated
with HCWs infected with H1N1 influenza [8,10]. However, the
highest rate of exposure for HCWs in this study was due to
unspecified contact. HCWs who acquired H1N1 influenza
appeared to have been infected from non-patient care exposure
or in social settings with colleagues. This phenomenon highlights
the necessity of public education to prevent further influenza
transmission. In addition, the viral loads in throat swabs were
higher in HCWs with patient contact and household contact
infections than in those with unspecified contact infections. A
possible explanation is that the HCWs in the first group were
infected with H1N1 influenza via direct, close contact with
patients in confined spaces such as wards or homes.
The influenza vaccine is effective in reducing mortality and
morbidity in children, the elderly, or debilitated patients
[14,15,16]. It has been shown to prevent infection in HCWs
and may reduce the days of absence from work during an
influenza epidemic [17]. In this study, the number of patients with
H1N1 infection decreased after vaccination was introduced. The
infection rate among HCWs with H1N1 infection was significantly
lower after vaccination than before vaccination. In addition, the
increase in influenza vaccination was associated with a significant
decrease in influenza among HCWs [18]. The rate of influenza
vaccination in HCWs was 95.5% in the study hospital. This high
rate of vaccination exceeded the target rate (80%) recommended
by CDC [19], and partly contributed to the low rate of H1N1
infection in HCWs at the hospital.
In conclusion, the surveillance systems, including a hospital
control strategy with daily temperature recording and online
education about infection control, were observed to have a low
attack rate of H1N1 influenza transmission in a 2600-bed hospital
before H1N1 (2009) influenza vaccination available, and the
attack rate is further decreased after mass vaccination. A further
seroepidemiologic investigation might be needed to detect the
HCWs with H1N1 who were not identified by the infection
control strategies. Nurses were at a higher risk of infection than
were other HCWs. The number of HCWs with unspecified
contact infections was significantly higher than were those with
patient contact and household contact infections, highlighting the
importance of public education on influenza transmission.
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